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ABSTRACT 
 
M-Combinatorialism and the Semantics of SQML. 
(May 2011) 
Robert K. Driggers, B.A., University of Alabama 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Christopher Menzel 
Dr. Robert Garcia 
 
The Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML) is controversial because it seems 
to conflict with some of our most basic intuitions about what is possible and what is 
necessary. Two controversial principles, the Barcan Schema (BS) and Necessary 
Existence NE, are valid in SQML models. Informally expressed, BS requires that, if it is 
possible that something is F, then there is something that is possibly F. This result seems 
to conflict with the intuition that there is some property F such that  F could have been 
exemplified, though is not possibly exemplified by any existing thing. NE conflicts with 
the intuition that there could have been more/different existents than there actually are 
and the intuition that those things that actually exist could have failed to exist. The 
primary goal of this thesis is to provide a semantics for SQML that justifies the validity 
of BS and NE with these intuitions in mind. This is the focus of the fifth section of the 
thesis. In the first four sections of the thesis, I discuss prior attempts to meet my primary 
goal, all of which I consider unsuccessful. 
According to my view, which I call M-combinatorialism, the world is comprised 
of simples, mereological sums of those simples and universals that the former objects 
 iv 
exemplify. I argue that we can justify the validity of BS by appealing to these facts about 
simples and sums:  (1) simples are arranged such that the sums of these simples 
exemplify certain properties, (2) the actual arrangement of any given number of simples 
is a contingent matter and (3) had the simples that are actually arranged to form the 
complex objects in the actual world been arranged differently, the sums of these simples 
could have exemplified radically different properties. 
Insofar as Combinatorialists construct all possible individuals only out of actual 
individuals, they are committed to the necessary existence of those actual individuals, 
which allows the M-Combinatorialist to justify the validity of NE. So, the M-
Combinatorialist is able to provide an adequate semantics for SQML. In the final 
section, I defend my view against objections. 
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This thesis follows the style of The MLA Handbook. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML) has caused controversy among 
metaphysicians because it seems to conflict with some of our most basic intuitions about 
what is possible and what is necessary. Two controversial principles, the Barcan Schema 
(BS) and Necessary Existence (NE) are valid in SQML models (Sider, 2010). BS 
requires that, if something is possibly !, then there is something that is possibly !. For 
example, if something is possibly a child of the pope, then there must exist something 
that is possibly the pope’s child (Menzel, 2010). This result seems to conflict with what I 
call the essentialist intuition, the intuition that there is some property ! such that  ! 
could have been exemplified, though is not possibly exemplified by any existing thing 
(e.g, there could have been a child of the pope, though no existing thing could have been 
that child.) NE requires that everything that exists necessarily exists. NE conflicts with 
the intuition that there could have been more/different existents than there actually are 
(call this intuition Aliens) and the intuition that those things that actually exist could 
have failed to exist (call this intuition Absentees) (Lycan 304-12, Nelson 278). Because 
the validity of BS and NE conflict with these basic intuitions, we have cause to abandon 
SQML. The primary goal of this thesis is to provide a semantics for SQML that provides 
reasonable justification for the validity of BS and NE with these intuitions in mind. I am 
not, however, the first to attempt to give SQML a justifiable semantics. In the first two 
sections of the thesis, I discuss prior attempts to meet my primary goal, all of which I 
consider unsuccessful.  
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In the first section, I describe Meinongian and possibilist semantics for SQML, 
with the promise that these are semantics I ultimately reject. Meinongians believe that 
there are some objects which fail to exist, which they call subsisting objects (Meinong 
78-81). Possibilists believe that there exist some objects that do not actually exist, which 
they call mere possibilia (Menzel). In previous works, many who reject Meinongianism 
and possibilism tend to conflate the two theories, which I believe has caused some undue 
confusion. So, one secondary goal of this section is to clear up that ambiguity by giving 
a full and fair explication of both theories. Another secondary goal of this section is to 
provide a detailed account of how both theories manage to provide a semantics for 
SQML while retaining revised versions of the intuitions mentioned above. The reason I 
offer for rejecting both theories is their extreme lack of ideological and ontological 
economy: both theories are able to achieve expressiveness only at the direct cost of 
positing new primitive concepts and strange metaphysical objects (Menzel, 2010). That 
being said, the primary goal of this section is not to quibble over the details of each 
theory, but to point out a theoretical structure present in both theories that, I argue, ought 
to be dispensed with.  
In the second section, I give a brief description of the thesis of actualism and its 
relationship to the intuitions described above. Actualists reject Possibilist/Meinongian 
metaphysics in favor of a ideologically and ontologically simpler theory: Actualists hold 
that everything that is exists and is actual (Menzel, 2010). Many (if not, most) Actualists 
reject SQML because it (1) conflicts with the intuitions outlined above and (2) is 
traditionally conceived as a logic requiring either a Meinongian or possibilist semantics. 
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Another primary goal of this thesis is to contest these prevalent beliefs about SQML, and 
in so doing, to provide a fully actualist semantics for SQML. 
Again, I am not the first to attempt to achieve such a goal. So-called proxy 
actualists believe that SQML can be given an actualist semantics if we accept their 
unique modal metaphysics (Bennett, 2006). There are two forms of proxy actualism: the 
first was developed by Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta and the second by Alvin 
Plantinga. 
Linsky and Zalta develop their semantics around the (nontraditional) idea that the 
categories of concreteness and nonconcreteness are not modally rigid—some objects are 
only contingently nonconcrete. These contingently nonconcrete objects serve as the 
truthmakers for claims about supposedly nonactual, possible individuals (445-51). After 
explaining how the authors make sense of the validity of BS and NE along with the 
intuitions outlined above, I offer reasons to reject their theory. The primary reason I 
offer is that Linsky and Zalta’s system is only superficially different from Meinong’s. 
The secondary reason I offer is that Linsky and Zalta’s rejection of the traditional view 
that existing nonconcrete and concrete objects are necessarily so requires such a break 
from our intuitions about the modal rigidity of those categories that their theory cannot 
be seen as an improvement over Meinongianism and possibilism (Menzel, 2010).  
After giving reasons to reject Linsky and Zalta’s proxy actualism, I move on to 
Plantinga’s form of proxy actualism. Plantinga holds that there exist individual essences, 
where an individual essence is “... a property E which is exemplified in some possible 
world and is such that, in every possible world, for every x, if x has E then: (a) x has E 
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essentially and (b) in no world does anything distinct from x have E. (Jager, 337). 
Plantinga’ s individual essences function in much the same way as Linsky and Zalta’s 
contingent nonconcretia. After describing how Plantinga’s individual essences allow him 
to make sense of the validity of BS and NE, I argue that his form of proxy actualism is 
preferable to Linsky and Zalta’s, due to its eschewing of the Meinongian/Possibilist 
theoretical structure. Having argued that, I provide reasons for rejecting Plantinga’s 
system and conclude that proxy actualism is a failed project (Menzel).  
In the fifth section, I argue for a combinatorialist semantics for SQML. 
Combinatorialists believe that nonactual, possible worlds and individuals must be 
constructed entirely out of the existents of the actual world rearranged in different 
patterns (an idea that needs clarification) (Lycan, Armstrong). I am not the first 
combinatorialist: in the first half of this section, I consider (and ultimately reject) a form 
of combinatorialism first developed by D.M. Armstrong.  
Armstrong holds that the world is fundamentally comprised of states-of-affairs, 
whose (non-fundamental) constituents are simples and properties (38-53). Armstrong 
also holds that the only states-of-affairs that exist are those that actually exist: all 
nonactual, possible states-of-affairs are merely fictional objects. In its original form, 
Armstrong’s combinatorialism is inadequate for a semantics of SQML. BS clearly 
requires that if something is possibly !, then there is something that is possibly !. Since 
Armstrong excludes the existence of nonactual states-of-affairs and since states-of-
affairs are individuated solely by their abstract constituents, then, for some !, there 
exists no state-of-affairs that could have been !.  
  
5 
I attempt to remedy this problem by adding additional ideology to Armstrong’s 
theory: I introduce the notion of obtaining and non-obtaining states-of-affairs (Plantinga, 
257-8). With this addition to Armstrong’s ontology and ideology, I provide a semantics 
for SQML. However, I do so only to demonstrate the futility of such a move: I argue that 
the obtaining/non-obtaining distinction is a return to Meinongian ontology. Thus, I 
conclude that Armstrong’s combinatorialism is not adequate for providing a semantics 
for SQML. 
In the next section, I describe my own view. According to M-combinatorialism, 
the world is comprised of simples, mereological sums of those simples and universals 
that the former objects exemplify. I argue that we can justify the validity of BS by 
appealing to these simple facts about simples and complex objects:  (1) simples are 
arranged such that the sums of these simples exemplify certain properties in addition to 
the properties that the simples exemplify (2) the actual arrangement of any given number 
of simples is a contingent matter and (3) had the simples that are actually arranged to 
form the complex objects in the actual world been arranged differently, the sums of these 
simples could have exemplified radically different properties (van Inwagen). 
Insofar as combinatorialists construct all possible individuals only out of actual 
individuals, they are committed to the necessary existence of those actual individuals. 
This fact, along with the fact that universals necessarily exist, allows the M-
Combinatorialist to justify the validity of NE. So, the M-Combinatorialist is able to 
provide an adequate semantics for SQML. 
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In the penultimate section, I consider the objections to M-Combinatorialism. 
William Lycan originally offered the first objection I consider. Lycan argues that no 
form of combinatorialism can grant the truth of Aliens and Absentees. I acknowledge 
that I owe Lycan and those who hold fast to Aliens and Absentees (which are prima 
facie incompatible with the validity of NE) an answer. First, I provide a (slightly 
revisionary) way of understanding Aliens and Absentees that is compatible with M-
Combinatorialism, with the suggestion that many of our intuitions can be captured by 
my theory. However, I acknowledge that I am committed to the necessary existence of 
simples, sums, and properties. In response, I carve up modality into two forms: world-
relative and world-neutral modality, where M-Combinatorialism is only compatible with 
the former kind of modality. I argue that the M-Combinatorialist should hold that world-
neutral modality is not a legitimate form of modality. So, I conclude that SQML should 
be interpreted as a logic of world-relative possibility with a combinatorialist semantics. 
Next, I consider the objection that M-Combinatorialism fails to take into account 
intuitions about individuals having essential properties. M-Combinatorialism 
individuates mereological sums only by their constitutive simples, leaving the possibility 
open that, for example, Bertrand Russell could have been a poached egg. To 
accommodate this intuitive difficulty with M-Combinatorialism, I utilize Armstrong’s 
conceptions of thin and thick particulars to argue that (1) there is ambiguity in what our 
proper names refer to and (2) the quantifiers of SQML must be interpreted as ranging 
over thin particulars only. I conclude that the M-Combinatorialist would be best served 
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to drop essentialist intuitions completely. With these objections met, I conclude my 
thesis. 
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2. THE CONTROVERSY OVER SQML 
In this essay, I will be defending the view that the Simplest Quantified Modal 
Logic (SQML) is an adequate logic for formalizing modal statements and modal 
reasoning, if we understand the semantics of SQML as I do. While most of my attention 
will be directed towards developing and defending my semantics of SQML, I want to 
take a brief moment to explain why we need a modal logic like SQML in the first place. 
The primary goal of developing a logic of any kind is providing a medium in 
which our reasoning about the world can be more closely scrutinized. One logic L1 is 
more expressive than another L2 insofar as L1 is able to adequately formalize more of 
our reasoning about the world than L2. Standard propositional logic and first-order 
predicate logic are useful for formalizing statements and reasoning about the actual 
world, the world we are most acquainted with. However, many believe that (1) the way 
that the actual world happens to be is only one of many ways that it could have been and 
(2) there are certain features of the actual world which must remain the same regardless 
of changes in other features. Standard propositional and first-order predicate logics are 
not expressive enough to handle claims about how the world could have been or how it 
must be, as they merely help us describe how the world actually is. Hence the 
development of modal logics like SQML—logics with the formal machinery necessary 
for formalizing modal reasoning. 
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SQML is a simple extension of classical predicate logic with a necessity operator, 
¨ and a possibility operator, ♢.1 SQML models have two domains, a domain of 
individuals and a domain of “worlds.” The first domain is for interpretation of the 
quantifiers and the second domain is for interpretation of the modal operators. The 
modal operators are understood semantically as quantifiers over possible worlds.2 The 
extension of classical predicate logic with of modal operators allows for logical 
representation of de re modal statements, which are formalized as an individual’s having 
a certain property in a certain world. 
It is important to note that SQML is a fixed-domain modal logic unlike variable-
domain modal logics like the Variable Domain Quantified Modal Logic (VDQML). 
Models of SQML contain only one domain, D, for interpreting the existential and 
universal quantifiers. Regardless of which world is the world of evaluation, the 
quantifiers only range over the members of that fixed domain. In models of VDQML, 
each world w is assigned a domain of its own (Menzel) and the (main) quantifier of a 
quantified formula evaluated at w ranges only over w’s domain. 
As a direct logical result of SQML’s containing only one domain for the 
interpretation of the quantifiers, certain controversial schemas turn out valid. Because 
one of the primary goals of this paper is to justify the validity of these schemas in the 
                                                                                                    
1 See Sider, Logic for Philosophy for the language of SQML that I will employ throughout this 
paper. 
2 That is not to say that treating modal operators as quantifiers over possible worlds is 
uncontroversial. Bennett argues in “Two Axes of actualism” that the extensional treatment of 
possible worlds is a primary cause of the confusion about the semantics of quantified modal 
logic. 
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face of controversy, we must consider what these schemas suggest about the relationship 
between the actual world and other possible worlds and why the validity of these 
schemas is so controversial. 
The schema that has received the most attention is the Barcan Schema: 
BS: ♢∃xφ→∃x♢φ 
Consider the following instance of BS: ♢∃xFx→∃x♢Fx. Let the predicate ‘F’ 
stand for “is a child of the Pope.”3 Loosely translated, the formula reads, “If a child of 
the Pope possibly exists, then there exists something that is possibly a child of the Pope.” 
Regardless of our positions on the semantics of SQML, the antecedent of BS seems 
fairly uncontroversial: after all, we all agree that the Pope, who in fact has no child, is 
nevertheless a fertile male who could have had one, or, if infertile, a male that could 
have been fertile and could have had a child. However, many disagree about the truth of 
the consequent, as it suggests that there is some existing thing that could have been the 
Pope’s child. Those who deny the truth of the consequent believe that nothing that exists 
could have been the Pope’s child: they deny that any existing thing could have been a 
child of the Pope due to intuitions about the essential features of the child of the pope. 
For example, it is a common intuition that our genetic origins are essential to our identity. 
The claim is that given the essentiality of the biological origins of currently existing 
persons and the Pope’s child, no existing person could have been the Pope’s child rather 
                                                                                                    
3 I will be using the example of the Pope’s child throughout this paper. We should assume that 
the Pope never has and never will have a child. The Pope’s child, then, is intended to be an 
example of something that does not actually exist, but could have existed. 
  
11 
than the child of her actual parents. Because I will be referring to this intuition later, it 
will be helpful to give it a name and a definition: 
The Essentialist Intuition (EI): For some property θ, θ could have 
been exemplified, though no actually existing thing could have 
exemplified θ.4  
I will have much to say about BS and EI later, but for now, let’s move on to the next 
controversial schema. 
Consider the second controversial schema to be discussed in this paper, the 
Necessary Existence schema: 
NE: ∀x¨∃y x=y 
Semantically, NE states that everything that exists necessarily exists: every 
person, table, chair, quark, etc. cannot have failed to exist. Why? Because, unlike in 
VDQML, the quantifiers in SQML range only over one domain of individuals, 
regardless of which possible world is under consideration. Semantically, this means that, 
because every individual in the domain inhabits every possible world, every individual 
necessarily exists. There are several intuitive difficulties with accepting the validity of 
this schema, but I will only mention those at the forefront of the debate over SQML.5 
                                                                                                    
4 Bennett, for example, seems to have this intuition. She writes, “[The Barcan Schema] entails 
the existence of a thing that has the modal property possibly being a Jabberwock--a commitment 
fully compatible with actualism as long as the potential Jabberwock actually exists […]. The 
problem is that few of us believe that that is the case; few of us believe that any actually existing 
object could be a Jabberwock.” (“Two Axes of actualism,” 301) A Jabberwock is her example of 
a thing that could have existed though it doesn’t in fact exist, never has, and never will. 
5 For example, I will not discuss the worry that SQML is incompatible with the proposition that 
God is the only individual that exists necessarily. In SQML, all members of the domain of 
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 NE is incompatible with the related intuitions that the world could have 
had more, fewer, or different existents than it happens to have. Because I will be 
referring to these intuitions later in this paper, it will be helpful to give each intuition a 
separate name and explicit definition.6 
Aliens: There could have been something that doesn’t actually exist. 
Absentees: There is something that could have failed to exist. 
I take most of the controversy surrounding SQML to result from the 
counterintuitiveness of BS and NE. So, I take it as a primary desideratum of any 
semantics of SQML to justify the validity of these schemas by (1) offering unique 
interpretations of intuitions like Absentees, Aliens, and EI and then (2) demonstrating 
how the validity of BS and NE are not in conflict with those intuitions. All of the views I 
consider in this paper employ this general strategy. 
There have been many attempts to give SQML a viable metaphysical 
interpretation and this paper is a continuation of that project. Each attempt to justify 
SQML involves developing a unique metaphysical theory of modality. Unfortunately, 
not all of the metaphysical theories used to justify BS and NE are attractive in their own 
right, as they require us to radically change some of our most basic intuitions about what 
exists and how it exists. The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of SQML 
                                                
quantification are necessary existents. God exists necessarily along with you and I, tables and 
chairs, subatomic particles, etc. I take this to be a worry for theistic readers to keep in mind 
about SQML.	  
6 The terms ‘Aliens’ and ‘Absentees’ and their definitions (with some modification) are 
borrowed from Nelson and Zalta (287). Bennett, Lycan and Plantinga share these intuitions. 
  
13 
that justifies the validity of BS and NE without requiring a fundamental shift in our 
metaphysical worldview. However, my attempt to defend SQML is certainly not the first. 
So, in the following sections, I will explicate different attempts to provide an 
interpretation of SQML and show how those views justify the validity of BS and NE. 
The first two semantics of SQML I will consider are Meinongian and possibilist 
semantics. 
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3. THE UNBEARABLE ONTOLOGY OF (POSSIBLE) BEING 
Both of the semantics I explicate in this section rely on reinterpreting the linkage 
between the concepts of actuality, existence, and being to make sense of the validity of 
BS and NE. Both theories hold that the domain over which the quantifiers range in an 
“intended” SQML interpretation includes many more members than we might have 
previously imagined. The inclusion of these new members is key to justifying the 
validity of BS and NE. As I will note at the end of the section, what matters for the 
purposes of providing a semantics for SQML is not the ontology of each theory, but the 
common structure that both theories share. Most importantly, it is the rejection of this 
structure that will guide the theories examined in forthcoming sections. Let’s start with 
the Meinongian approach, named for the metaphysical theory of objects proposed by 
Alexius Meinong in his “The Theory of Objects.” 
3.1 MEINONGIAN SEMANTICS FOR SQML 
Meinong’s ontology of objects is as massive as it is nontraditional. He writes,  
Without doubt, metaphysics has to do with everything that exists. 
However, the totality of what exists…is infinitely small in comparison 
with the totality of the Objects of knowledge. (79) 
According to Meinong, the “totality of the Objects of knowledge” includes not only 
those objects that exist, but also those objects that subsist. Existing objects are the 
objects we are all already familiar with: living persons, computers, quarks, etc. However, 
existing objects are only a small subset of “the totality of objects.” The totality also 
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includes subsisting objects, those objects that are (in some primitive sense) but fail to 
exist. Nonexistent, subsisting objects are a unique bunch: they have among their kind 
merely possible objects like the Pope’s child, impossible objects like the round square, 
and abstract objects like numbers and sets.7 
Note that what it means to “subsist” cannot be explained in more fundamental 
terms because subsistence is a primitive concept in Meinong’s theory. In order to make 
room for this primitive concept, it is fundamental to Meinong’s theory to break the 
apparent intuitive linkage between actuality, existence, and being. In Meinong’s theory, 
“being” and “existence” are not univocal terms—they pick out vastly different kinds of 
objects. In other words, Meinong breaks the apparently intuitive linkage between being 
and existence. 
If anything is true about the literature surrounding SQML, it’s that Meinong’s 
theory is considered a last resort: Meinong’s ontology contains strange objects not 
countenanced by traditional metaphysical theories. For Meinong, given any object of 
thought, there is a corresponding existing object in the mind-independent world. I 
suspect, however, that many philosophers have the intuition that there need exist no such 
corresponding object. Our minds are simple not efficacious in this way. Furthermore, 
Meinong’s commitment to the (mind-independent) existence of every object of thought 
entails that insofar as we can direct thoughts at objects like square circles, those objects 
exist. However, it is generally understood that we have no good reason to countenance 
                                                                                                    
7 See Parsons for an elegant exposition of Meinongian semantics. 
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such objects: after all, the fact that square circles are in principle not instantiable might 
give us good reason to think that they do not exist.  
Further, Meinong’s ideology contains at minimum two primitive concepts—
‘existence’ and ‘subsistence,’ reserved for objects that exist and subsist, respectively.8 So, 
why would Meinong posit such strange metaphysical elements and additional 
metaphysical structure?  Because, Meinong would say (and his followers still say), these 
objects are indispensable to our fashioning a complete picture of reality. Let me explain. 
Meinong’s theory involves what is essentially a trade-off between ontological 
and ideological complexity and theoretical unification. Meinong takes his subsisting 
objects to solve philosophical puzzles regarding the nature of abstracta, impossible 
objects, nonexistent, possible objects, mathematical objects, and fictional objects. For 
example, Meinong apparently thought that subsisting objects provide a subject matter for 
mathematics, as he conceived numbers as subsisting objects (80-1). For our purposes, 
the application of Meinong’s theory to other domains is irrelevant, but it is worth noting 
that the theory provides a unifying metaphysical framework. Whether the inclusion of 
subsisting objects, given the counterintuitive results of this inclusion, in our fundamental 
ontology is necessary is one of the questions addressed in this paper. 
                                                                                                    
8 For this point, see Lycan (285). Some readers might be unfamiliar with the ontology/ideology 
distinction. I have in mind Quine’s definitions from his essay “Ontology and Ideology.” I repeat 
them here for the reader’s sake.  
Quine defines a theory’s ontology as, “the objects over which the bound variables of the theory 
have to be construed as ranging in order that the statements affirmed in the theory be true”(11). 
Of ideology, he writes,  “Another no less important aspect [of a theory] into which we can 
inquire is its ideology […]: what ideas can be expressed in it? […] As a subdivision of ideology 
there is the question of what ideas are fundamental or primitive for a theory, and what ones 
derivative. […] “ What matters for metaphysics is absolute ideology, of which Quine writes, 
“…in absolute ideology we ask what ideas can legitimately be had, or what primitive ideas are 
given to us as a basis for thinking”(14-5). 
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Now that I’ve given a brief picture of Meinong’s ontology and ideology, it is 
time to return to the important question to ask of Meinong’s theory: how can subsisting 
objects be of use in providing an adequate semantics for SQML? 
The first obvious point is that the quantifiers of SQML, given this Meinongian 
framework, range over subsisting objects and existing objects alike. These objects allow 
Meinong to give a revisionary account of EI: for any property ! that is possibly 
exemplified, though not by any existing object, the Meinongian holds that there is some 
subsisting object that could have exemplified !.  This account is revisionary insofar as 
Meinong takes EI to be concerned with existing objects (those objects we are most 
familiar with) and not the totality of objects of knowledge. Because subsisting objects 
are so modally malleable, one can consistently hold EI with respect to existing objects 
and consistently maintain BS.9 I’ll explain. 
Remember that the troubling fact about BS is that it seems to invalidate EI, the 
intuition that, say, no existing thing could have been a child of the Pope. Now, the 
Meinongian can both consistently hold that no existing thing could have been a child of 
the Pope, while maintaining the validity of BS. Why? Because the quantifier in BS, 
given a Meinongian semantics, ranges over subsisting objects as well as existing objects 
and the Meinongian holds that the Pope’s possible child is a subsisting object that, had it 
existed, would have been a child of the Pope. So far so good. 
                                                                                                    
9 Of course, if EI were understood to be referring to everything that is (the totality of objects of 
knowledge), then Meinong’s account would be flawed. However, due to the modally malleable 
nature of subsisting objects, it’s difficult to understand how one could consistently hold EI and 
posit their existence. This is an area worth pursuing for the Meinongian. 
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Also remember that NE seemed to be at odds with Aliens and Absentees, the 
intuitions that the actual world could have contained more objects that it actually does 
and that there are certain objects in the actual world that could have failed to exist. Again, 
the Meinongian has an answer: everything that is (i.e, the totality of Objects of 
knowledge) is necessarily, regardless of its status as an existing or subsisting object. 
Because the quantifiers of SQML are interpreted as ranging over the (necessarily 
existing) totality of Objects of knowledge, the Meinongian can justify the validity of NE.  
What drove our initial intuition about falsity of NE is the belief that everything that is 
exists. But, Meinong argues, subsisting things, though failing to exist, are. Since the 
quantifier of SQML ranges over those things which are and not only over those things 
which exist, NE causes the Meinongian no discomfort. After all, existence (though not 
being) is, in general, a contingent matter for the Meinongian. 
The Meinongian is also able to maintain the intuitive appeal of Aliens and 
Absentees, along with the validity of NE. There could have existed more objects than 
actually exist had certain nonexistent, subsisting objects existed. Likewise, objects that 
actually exist could have failed to exist had they remained mere subsisting objects.  
But remember, the Meinongian is able to make sense of the validity of these 
schemas alongside the appeal of these intuitions at a high price: the Meinongian must 
posit a whole new array of strange, nonexistent objects and include new primitive 
concepts into his ideology. The big question in the debate surrounding SQML is this: can 
we get away with the appeal of Meinongianism without commitment to Meinongian 
metaphysics? If a metaphysical theory and corresponding semantics can maintain or 
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explain away Aliens, Absentees, and EI without commitment to Meinongian subsisting 
objects, then we ought to accept that theory. In the following sections, I will analyze 
theories that attempt to do just that. 
3.2 POSSIBILIST SEMANTICS FOR SQML 
There is a view closely connected with Meinong’s theory called possibilism, a 
view that also breaks the intuitive linkage between existence, being, and actuality. 
Where Meinong broke the linkage between existence and being, the possibilist breaks 
the linkage between existence/being and actuality. That is, the possibilist holds that, 
while everything that is exists (pace Meinong), not everything that exists is actual. The 
possibilist includes in her ontology existing things that are only possibly actual exist, 
where the thesis that there are things that are possibly actual but not actual is part of the 
possibilist’s fundamental ideology. These nonactual, possible objects, or mere possibilia, 
as they are often called, are do not actually exist: they are only possibly actual.; that is, 
they could have been actual but, in fact, are not actual  
Interpreting SQML as the logic of possibilism clears up much of the confusion 
surrounding SQML, a primary goal of this essay.10 Possibilists give a revisionary 
account of EI, the intuition that there is a property that could have been exemplified, but 
not by any existing object. The possibilist agrees that no actual thing could have been, 
say, the child of the Pope; but she also argues that this is not equivalent to the claim that 
nothing, i.e., no existing thing, could have been the child of the Pope. The possibilist 
denies this latter claim, as she holds that there is a merely possible object that, had it 
                                                                                                    
10 Cf. Williamson for a possibilist semantics of SQML 
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been actual, would have been the child of the Pope (Williamson, 257-8). The same holds 
mutatis mutandis for any imaginable nonactual, possible object.11 
At this point, it should be obvious how the possibilist provides a semantics for 
SQML. Take BS, for instance. Because it is affirmed that there could have existed a 
child of the Pope, BS commits one to the existence of something that is possibly the 
child of the Pope. The possibilist takes no issue with this commitment: she holds that 
there is a merely possible object that is possibly the child of the Pope.  Now, turn to NE. 
The possibilist holds that everything that exists exists necessarily and that the quantifiers 
of SQML range over these existing objects, not merely the subset of actually existing 
objects (Menzel).  
The validity of NE ought to make sense, the possibilist holds, if we understand 
that intuitively contingent beings are only contingently actual, not contingently existing. 
It is with this understanding of the relationship between existence and actuality that we 
are able to make sense of Aliens and Absentees—(1) there could have been an object 
that doesn’t actually exist, namely a merely possible object that could have been actual 
and (2) if ‘existence’ in Absentees is understood as ‘actual existence,’ then it is true that 
there are existing objects that could have failed to exist. 
As was noted with Meinongianism, the utility of possibilism comes at a cost: 
possibilism requires us to include mere possibilia in our fundamental ontologies. The 
claim is, of course, that mere possibilia are necessary for making sense of modal 
                                                                                                    
11 Again, insofar as EI is not restricted to actually existing objects, such a move will be 
unsuccessful. That is, one might insist that EI holds for all existing objects, regardless of their 
status as actual objects. 
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discourse. And again, any theory that can retain the expressiveness of possibilism 
without possibilism’s commitments is the preferable theory. However, before I evaluate 
and attempt to defend a theory that attempts to do without the commitments of 
Meinongianism and possibilism, I want to make a general point about the identical 
structure of both theories, as this common structure will be present in a theory I will 
discuss in the next section. 
3.3 THE COMMON STRUCTURE OF THESE THEORIES 
I promised earlier that the details of each theory aren’t as important as the 
structure of each theory. In fact, I believe both Meinongianism and possibilism are so 
similar in structure that it can be difficult to differentiate between the two theories. Let 
me explain. 
Both theories posit a fundamental ontological category — being for the 
Meinongian, being/existence for the possibilist — whose members are necessarily 
members of that category. Both theories, however, include at least two additional 
subcategories of this fundamental ontological category that many objects in the 
fundamental category belong to only contingently. For the Meinongian these additional 
categories are existence and subsistence. For the possibilist, these categories are actual 
existence and nonactual, possible existence. 
However, just because both theories have an identical structure, does not mean 
(1) that both theories have identical ontological and ideological commitments or (2) that 
there is no reason to prefer one theory to the other. The truth of (1) ought to be obvious 
from previous discussion. One might hold (2) for a variety of reasons: for example, the 
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Meinongian might hold that her theory is preferable to the possibilist’s because the 
subsisting objects play many more metaphysical roles than the mere possibilia. That is, 
the Meinongian might argue that her theory is preferable because it provides a means 
through which we can understand, say, the subject matter of mathematics and the nature 
of ‘abstract’ objects, whereas the possibilist’s mere possibilia may serve as modal 
truthmakers and not much more. 
However, this is not the place to offer a full-throated defense of either 
Meinongianism or possibilism. In fact, the opposite is true: for the remainder of this 
paper, I will be arguing that we can, after all, dispense with the ontology and ideology of 
Meinongianism and possibilism while giving a semantics for SQML. For the remainder 
of this essay, I will be arguing that the presence of the common structure mentioned 
above is a strong mark against a metaphysical theory of modality. But enough of getting 
clear on the theories that I deny: let’s move into more positive territory. 
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4. ACTUALISM AND THE SEMANTICS OF SQML 
As I mentioned before, this essay will provide an actualist semantics for SQML. 
This has proven to be a difficult task; after all, many actualists are eager to eschew 
SQML as their modal logic of choice because the validity of BS and NE purportedly 
conflicts with actualist intuitions. So, before I begin my defense of an actualist semantics 
of SQML, I will explicate the thesis of actualism and throw into sharp relief the tension 
between this thesis and the apparent metaphysical commitments of SQML. Then, I will 
explicate previous unsuccessful attempts by actualists to give said semantics. 
We can define actualism simply as the denial of possibilism: 
Actualism: Everything that exists actually exists. 
Now, I could continue on with the remainder of this project with this definition of 
actualism, but I won’t: as I explained in the previous section, possibilism and 
Meinongianism share a common theoretical structure, and I believe actualism is more 
clearly understood as a denial of this common structure. So, I don’t believe that this 
definition of actualism is an adequate denial of this structure: Given this version of 
actualism, a Meinongian could easily be an actualist: after all, Meinong, who held that 
being and existence are not univocal, also seems to have held that existence and actuality 
are univocal (78-81). I do not believe that defining actualism in this way is appropriate. 
In this paper, I want to defend a form of actualism that denies both Meinongianism and 
possibilism and completely rejects the common structure of these two theories. So, I will 
be operating under the following definition of actualism: 
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Actualism: Everything that is exists and everything that exists 
actually exists.12 
This definition of actualism excludes both subsisting objects and mere possibilia, 
exclusions characteristic of actualism. Additionally, this definition more adequately 
states the actualist denial of the Meinongian and possibilist theoretical structure: 
Actualists, given this definition of actualism, believe that there is but one fundamental 
ontological category. I previously discussed the intuitive linkage between the concepts 
existence, being, and actuality. Both possibilists and Meinongians claim that the linkage 
separating these concepts must be broken in order to give an adequate metaphysical 
theory of modality. And, both claim that an adequate semantics of SQML can only be 
provided under their metaphysical theories. Actualists, by contrast, believe that the 
ontological and ideological commitments of these theories are counterintuitive and 
(more importantly) unnecessary for an adequate semantics for modal discourse. The 
primary goal of this thesis is to defend a form of actualism as providing an adequate 
semantics for modal discourse that is consistent with the controversial theorems of 
SQML. However, it has been argued, the tenets of actualism are incompatible with the 
valid formulas of SQML. Let’s see why an actualist would hold that view. 
Actualists traditionally take the Essentialist Intuition very seriously: most 
actualists believe that there exists some property that though possibly exemplified is not 
possibly exemplified by any actually existing thing. Our previous example of such a 
                                                                                                    
12 This is roughly the definition given by Menzel, Adams, and Williamson, who hold that 
actualism is the thesis that everything is actual. 
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property was the property of being a child of the Pope: Actualists generally agree that (i) 
it is possible that such a property be exemplified, though they do not believe that any 
actual thing could have been, for example, a child of the Pope and (ii) that the only 
means by which one could maintain EI and SQML — with its controversial theorems 
BS and NE — would be to adopt a possibilist or Meinongian semantics for SQML. So, 
they typically reject SQML. 
Note, however, that the denial of BS is not entailed by the bare thesis of 
actualism: rather, the thesis simply entails that, even if it is possible that the Pope have a 
child, there exists no subsisting nor merely possible object that could have been that 
child. EI, an additional intuition that actualists often have, suggests that no actual object 
could serve as a substitute for merely possible and subsisting objects. Without a 
substitute for these counterintuitive objects, the truth of the consequent of BS is difficult 
to justify. I believe it that many actualists abandon SQML because they take EI so 
seriously, though it is not directly entailed by their primary thesis. As I will argue and 
others have argued, denying EI is crucial to understanding the validity of BS. More on 
that point later. For now, it is important to note that as a matter of historical fact, many 
actualists have rejected SQML for the reasons outline above. 
The denial of NE is also not entailed by the bare thesis of actualism. However, 
actualists also take the intuitions behind Aliens and Absentees very seriously: many 
actualists have the intuition that the actual world could have had more, fewer, or 
different fundamental stuff than it actually has. However, NE entails that everything that 
actually exists necessarily exists. And so, actualists have often held that the only means 
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by which one could consistently maintain Aliens, Absentees, and SQML is by adopting 
non-actualist theories.  
However, nothing about the bare thesis of actualism entails Aliens and 
Absentees: actualism merely entails that no merely possible or subsisting object can be 
posited to make those intuitions true. And, as with EI, some actualists have argued that 
the intuitions behind Aliens and Absentees can be interpreted within an actualist 
framework. 
In the next subsection, I will be describing two actualist theories that either deny 
or reinterpret EI, Aliens, and Absentees in an effort to provide an actualist semantics for 
SQML. However, I will argue, neither of these theories is an improvement over 
Meinongianism or possibilism. 
4.1 PROXY ACTUALISM 
The two actualist theories I will consider in this section share a similar strategy, 
so I will use a single name for any theory that employs this similar strategy: proxy 
actualism.13 Proxy actualists have an interesting relationship with EI. One the one hand, 
proxy actualists hold that the concrete objects of the actual world are not sufficiently 
malleable to serve as modal truth makers. That is, proxy actualists are sympathetic to EI 
insofar as it relates to concrete objects. However, they ultimately attempt to provide a 
semantics for SQML by denying EI, insofar as they believe that there exist actual 
abstract objects that can serve as modal truthmakers for our modal claims about 
nonactual, possible individuals. 
                                                                                                    
13 The name is originally from Bennett (“Proxy actualism”). 
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Proxy actualists employ the same general strategy for making sense of claims 
about nonactual, possible individuals: they posit at least one new class of entities 
(Bennett calls them “proxies”) to serve as substitutes for nonactual, possible objects and 
subsisting objects. Proxies are purported to be actually existing objects that play all of 
the modal roles of merely possible objects and subsisting objects.  
There are two conceptually connected forms of proxy actualism. The first form 
was developed by Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta, who posit so-called contingent 
nonconcretia. The second was developed by Alvin Plantinga, who posits individual 
essences. In this section, I will present both views and ultimately give reasons to reject 
them. 
In their paper “A Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic,” Linsky and 
Zalta posit proxies dubbed the contingently nonconcrete. To get clear on what a 
contingently nonconcrete object is, let's make some distinctions. 
First, let's distinguish between concrete and nonconcrete objects.14 According to 
the authors, concreteness is a primitive concept, so our understanding of the concept is 
limited to listing properties and examples of both concrete and nonconcrete objects. 
Linsky and Zalta write, “[nonconcrete objects] are nonphysical, non-spatiotemporal, 
lacking in shape, size, texture, etc.” Examples are traditional abstract objects like 
numbers, sets, universals, etc. Concrete objects, by contrast, are spatiotemporally located 
and causally efficacious. Examples are human bodies, lamps, planets, etc. (446). 
                                                                                                    
14 This distinction might also be known as the concrete/abstract distinction. 
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We might have believed before reading Linsky and Zalta’s work that all 
nonconcrete objects are necessarily so. For example,  a pure set like, say, the empty set, 
is necessarily nonconcrete—in no possible world does there exist a concrete pure set. 
However, according to Linsky and Zalta, we ought to reconceptualize the rigidity of the 
concrete/nonconcrete distinction: they argue that not all nonconcrete objects are 
necessarily nonconcrete. The contingently nonconcrete are those individuals that are 
concrete in some possible world, but not in the actual world; and the contingently 
concrete are those objects that are concrete in the actual world but nonconcrete in 
nonactual, possible worlds.. Thus, for example, a possible child of the Pope is 
contingently nonconcrete on this view. You and I, however, are contingently concrete: 
we are actually concrete but, had things turned out a bit differently, we might have been 
nonconcrete. The domain of quantification, then, comprises the contingently 
nonconcrete, the contingently concrete, and the necessarily nonconcrete, all of which are 
actual entities. Talk about supposedly merely possible individuals like a possible child of 
the Pope is to be understood as talk about objects that are contingenetly non-concrete. 
Linsky and Zalta acknowledge that their rejiggering of the concrete/nonconcrete 
distinction might flout our previous intuitions. However, they argue, such rejiggering is 
justified given the theoretical work it allows us to do: because they include the 
contingently nonconcrete in SQML’s domain of quantification, Linsky and Zalta can 
justify the validity of BS and NE. Let’s start with their justification of BS. 
Linsky and Zalta justify the validity of BS by reinterpreting EI. The authors hold 
that the intuition actually underlying EI is that no concrete thing could have been a child 
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of the Pope. This intuition, along with the intuition that the abstract/concrete objects are 
necessarily so, they take to be the cause of actualist suspicions of BS (448-9). However, 
Linsky and Zalta’s world is not restricted to concrete objects, so this suspicion is 
unfounded. They argue that there does exist something that is possibly a child of the 
Pope, namely a nonconcrete object that, in another possible world, is a concrete child of 
the Pope. Their nonconcrete objects allow the authors to maintain the validity of BS in 
SQML without being committed to the existence of mere possibilia or subsisting objects. 
The contingently nonconcrete are those actual objects that replace these strange objects. 
Now on to NE. 
Of the validity of NE, Linsky and Zalta write: 
NE is also acceptable. Though NE asserts that everything necessarily 
exists, there is no conflict with intuition given that the actualist 
quantifier has no spatiotemporal connotations. The important thing is 
that neither NE nor ¨NE assert that everything (or indeed anything) 
is necessarily concrete. The intuition that a particular concrete object 
x might not have existed is captured in our logic by the idea that x is 
not necessarily concrete…. What more could be meant by saying that 
it, qua concrete object, doesn't exist there? […] This interpretation 
doesn't require that contingent concrete objects disappear from the 
logical scene just because they disappear from the physical scene at 
other worlds. (448-9) 
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So, Linsky and Zalta claim to be able to maintain the consistency of Aliens, 
Absentees, and NE by arguing that our ordinary intuitions about existence are restricted 
to those things that concretely exist. Aliens is interpreted as the claim that there could 
have been more concrete objects than there actually are and Absentees is interpreted as 
the claim that some of the concrete objects that are actually concrete could have been 
nonconcrete. And, an object’s being nonconcrete, is purportedly what our intuitions 
about nonexistence are really mapping onto. This is admittedly a revisionist account of 
our intuitions, but, the authors argue, sometimes revisionist accounts are necessary for 
adequately understanding reality. 
What do we make of Linsky and Zalta’s contingently nonconcrete? After all, 
they seem to allow us to both give an actualist semantics for SQML and better 
understand our intuitions about modality in general. But is Linsky and Zalta’s system 
really actualist? Let’s consider some arguments that purport to show that Linsky and 
Zalta’s system ought to be rejected because it is not actualist after all. 
I believe that actualists worry that Linsky and Zalta’s form of proxy actualism is 
not in fact actualist, because the basic structure of their theory mirrors the structure of 
possibilism and Meinongianism. 15 Remember that possibilists and Meinongians believe 
that there is a fundamental ontological category, which contains objects that are 
necessarily members of that category and that there are at least two additional 
subcategories membership in which, for some members, is only contingent.. Note that 
                                                                                                    
15 Many have made similar arguments related to this worry. See esp. Bennett (“Proxy actualism”), 
Menzel, Tomberlin. For replies to these objections see Zalta and Nelson. My own talk of 
“structural similarity” comes from Bennett (“Proxy  Actualism”). 
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Linsky and Zalta make a similar move in an effort to supplant mere possibilia with 
actual objects: they hold that the quantifiers in SQML range over actual objects, of 
which concrete objects and nonconcrete objects are subcategories. Where the 
Meinongian holds that these categories are existence and subsistence and the possibilist 
holds that these categories are actual and nonactual existence, Linsky and Zalta posit 
(actual) concreteness and (actual) nonconcreteness. If Linsky and Zalta held that all the 
members of these subcategories were members necessarily, then their theory would not 
mirror possibilism and Meinongianism. But they don’t: Linsky and Zalta believe that 
membership in these categories is a contingent matter and it is this very contingency that 
allows them to provide a semantics for SQML. However, because Linsky and Zalta 
allow for contingent membership in these categories, they cannot claim to have an 
actualist metaphysics. 
Luckily, Zalta and Nelson have had a chance to respond to the charge that their 
theory is not in fact actualist. They write: 
The structural similarities noted above arise from the fact that anti-
possibilist Meinongianism and [our theory] are two interpretations of 
a single formalism. But they are inconsistent interpretations of a 
single formalism and competing frameworks for the proper 
regimentation of ordinary modal intuitions. The advocate of [our 
theory] is an anti-Meinongian (and therefore denies anti-possibilist 
Meinongianism) and an anti-possibilist; everything, on her view, both 
exists and actually exists. The argument from analogy loses sight of 
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these facts and it is precisely because of these facts that [our theory] is 
a robust form of actualism whereas anti-possibilist Meinongianism is 
not. And because [our theory] is compatible with NE, BF… and the 
simplest QML more generally, Linsky and Zalta’s original claim to 
have presented a version of actualism consistent with the simplest 
QML stands defended. (292) 
Zalta and Nelson accept the fact that their theory shares a deep structural 
similarity with possibilism, but they deny that this entails that their theory is not actualist. 
However, Zalta and Nelson have not made a convincing case for this conclusion. My 
charge against Linsky and Zalta’s system is that it is simply Meinongianism and/or 
possibilism relabeled in actualist terms: the authors have not established how their 
theory is free of the Meinongian/possibilist theoretical structure in spite of its similarity 
to those theories. If that is the case, then the system is not actualist. 
Remember that Meinong and Linsky and Zalta divide their fundamental 
ontological category with certain primitive, irreducible concepts: for the Meinongian 
those concepts are ‘existence’ and ‘subsistence’ and for Linsky and Zalta ‘concreteness’ 
and ‘nonconcreteness.’ Because ‘concreteness’ is a primitive concept and 
‘nonconcreteness’ is defined in terms of that concept, both concepts can only be 
illuminated by ostension and by describing properties of those objects that fall under 
these concepts. Unfortunately, when we list these properties, it seems as if we are 
describing the same kinds of objects. For example, both subsisting objects and merely 
possible objects, like nonconcrete objects, are not spatiotemporally-located, are not 
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causally efficacious. Concrete objects, like Meinong’s existing objects and the 
possibilist’s actual objects, are causally efficacious, and have among their members only 
objects that are in principle empirically discoverable. Furthermore, some members of 
these categories are necessarily so—in some worlds, an actually nonconcrete object is 
concrete and in some worlds, a subsisting object exists—while all members of both 
categories belong to a more fundamental ontological category. 
I could go on with the similarities, but that would be unnecessary: it seems as if 
Linsky and Zalta have simply papered over the Meinongian/possibilist division of being 
with more contemporary (and actualist-friendly) terms. Until the authors can provide us 
with an attribute that, say, a nonconcrete object lacks but a subsisting object has, we 
have no reason to believe that their primitive concepts are not different names for the 
same things. Until then, we can safely conclude that Linsky and Zalta’s system is not an 
actualist one. Luckily, Linsky and Zalta’s form of proxy Actualism is not the only form, 
let’s see if Plantinga’s fares any better. 
Where Linsky and Zalta posit the contingently nonconcrete, Plantinga posits 
individual essences or haecceities. Semantically, Plantinga's individual essences function 
similarly to the contingently nonconcrete. According to Plantinga, an individual essence 
is: 
... a property E which is exemplified in some possible world and is 
such that, in every possible world, for every x, if x has E then: (a) x 
has E essentially and (b) in no world does anything distinct from x 
have E. (Jager, 337) 
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Properties, according to Plantinga, exemplified or not, exist in every possible 
world. Thus, individual essences exist in every possible world. However, which essences 
are exemplified varies across worlds. For example, according to Plantinga, the Pope 
could have had a child, if (1) there is an individual essence that is not exemplified and 
(2) in some world that essence is exemplified. With this view, Plantinga can maintain a 
single, fixed domain of quantification over actual individuals since his domain contains 
individual essences instead of mere possibilia.16 Plantinga can also give a consistent way 
to understand de re claims about possible individuals—they are claims about possible 
exemplifications of actually existing individual essences. 
Plantinga’s theory has the distinct advantage of avoiding the structure of 
possibilism and Meinongianism: Plantinga posits one fundamental ontological category 
(actual existence) that is subdivided into two classes of individuals: properties and non-
property-property-bearers (NPPBs).17 However, Plantinga eschews the suspect 
possibilist/Meinongian structure by leaving these categories modally rigid—no NPPB 
                                                                                                    
16 Let me stress the 'can' in the previous sentence. Note that Plantinga and Jager, as a matter of 
fact, preferred Kripke's variable domain modal logic (VDQML, see section 2). Jager's work 
gives a semantics for a variable-domain quantified modal logic that makes use of Plantinga's 
individual essences as actualist substitutes for merely possible objects. Having noted that, 
Plantinga and Jager's semantics can be easily adapted for a fixed-domain modal logic like 
SQML--one simply has to remove the variable domains in Kripke models and allow for 
unrestricted quantification over the superdomain. 
17 Plantinga does not commit himself to what these NPPBs might be. We might think of them as 
concrete objects, bare particulars, regions of spacetime, etc. The only sufficient conditions for x 
being a NPPB is that (1) x possibly exemplifies a property and (2) x is not itself possibly 
exemplified.  (2) must be included as a sufficient condition because properties themselves can 
exemplify properties. I will refer to objects like x as NPPBs for the remainder of this section. 
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could have been a property and no property could have been an NPPB. So, we would not 
be justified in accusing Plantinga of possibilism or Meinongianism. 
Plantinga’s individual essences are also useful in justifying the validity of BS in 
light of EI. EI is true, under Plantinga’s theory, if there is some property ! that this 
possibly co-exemplified with an individual essence, though not with any individual 
essence that is actually exemplified. An example of such a property is the property of the 
being the Pope’s child: no actually exemplified individual essence could have been co-
exemplified with this property (in layman’s terms: no actual individual could have been 
a child of the Pope).  However, this does not entail that the individual essence in 
question is (1) not possibly exemplified nor (2) not possibly exemplified along with any 
other property. So, Plantinga is able to affirm the truth of both the antecedent and 
consequent of BS along with the truth of EI. 
While Plantinga has a clear way of justifying the validity of BS, it’s not so clear 
that he can justify the validity of NE. Of course, because Plantinga’s properties are 
necessary existents, it is prima facie plausible that Plantinga’s system might avoid any 
tension with NE. However, it is important to note that while properties (and thus 
individual essences) necessarily exist on Plantinga’s view, properties are not the only 
members of Plantinga’s fundamental ontological category. Plantinga must also posit 
objects that possibly exemplify his individual essences: NPPBs. If we use Plantinga’s 
system as a semantics for SQML, then we will be committed to the necessary existence 
of not only properties, but also the bearers of those properties because NE requires the 
existence of every member of the domain in every possible world. Because the domain 
  
36 
includes both essences and things that exemplify essences (NPPBs), objects in both 
categories must necessarily exist.18 That fact has been hard for some to swallow for other 
semantics, so I imagine the same worries will arise for Plantinga’s system.19 However, I 
will argue later that worries about the necessary existence of objects like NPPBs are a 
result of a misunderstanding of the nature of modality. So, in an effort to avoid 
undermining my own semantics before I explicate them, I will let the worries 
surrounding NE pass, with the promise that I will take issue with them in Section 5. 
However, while Plantinga seems to have a plausible account of the validity of BS 
and NE, we have good reason to reject his theory independent of concerns about how it 
fits with SQML. Actualists also object to Plantinga's form of proxy actualism because 
it's not clearly a theoretical improvement over possibilism. Remember that Plantinga 
supplants mere possibilia with individual essences. An individual essence, however, is a 
strange type of property: it is a property that is both “logically simple” and not 
exemplifiable by multiple objects. A property is logically simple if “it is not itself a 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, quantification, modalization, etc. of any other 
properties or relations”(Menzel). Now, there seems to be a tight intuitive connection 
between a property's logical simplicity and its possible multiple-exemplification. For 
                                                                                                    
18 This is only true if we use Plantinga’s theory for interpreting SQML. This result can be said to 
be primarily a feature of SQML and not of Plantinga’s theory. Plantinga himself is not 
committed to the necessary existence of property-bearers. It can be understood as an unfortunate 
result of interpreting SQML with his semantics that these property-bearers necessarily exist. 
19 Plantinga might respond that my criticisms are unfounded because he has not in fact 
committed himself to the existence of NPPBs. That is, Plantinga might argue that his entire 
fundamental ontology is exhausted by properties, which are purported to necessarily exist, so 
that the validity of NE is no cause to worry. If that were the case, Plantinga would be committed 
to the view that existing things are bundles of properties.  
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example, squareness is a property that is both logically simple and exemplified by many 
different particulars. Plantinga's essences are an oddity, according to Menzel, because 
they are both logically simple and not exemplifiable by many different particulars. I 
assume that most metaphysicians have the intuition that properties are necessarily 
exemplifiable by multiple objects, as properties are often posited to explain what 
different particulars have in common. However, as Menzel writes, “Plantinga flouts 
these intuitions in order to introduce an entirely new class of simple property whose sole 
function is to serve as an actualist counterpart to possibilia. Sacrificing such a crucial 
intuition for understanding properties for the sake of supplanting merely possible objects 
with actual objects is at least as unattractive as positing mere possibilia, especially if the 
motivation for doing so is providing a semantics for SQML. 
So, where do we stand with proxy actualism? I have argued that Linsky and 
Zalta’s form of actualism is simply Meinongianism papered over with actualist 
terminology and that Plantinga’s form of actualism is not clearly preferable to 
possibilism and Meinongianism, because Plantinga posits objects equally as strange as 
mere possibilia and subsisting objects. In short, if actualists decide to posit the existence 
of strange metaphysical objects (proxies) in order to (1) avoid commitment to the 
existence of mere possibilia while (2) maintaining that SQML is amenable to actualism, 
it's not clear that actualists shouldn't simply accept that SQML is not a viable means of 
formalizing statements of modality. So, I will conclude that the proxy actualist's strategy 
of positing strange, albeit actual, objects in place of merely possible objects is not an 
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attractive move. In the next section, however, I argue that we can make sense of the 
validity of the controversial schemas of SQML without positing such strange objects. 
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5. COMBINATORIALISM 
The theories addressed in the previous section are centered around the idea that 
the actual world contains objects useful for making sense of BS and NE. However, as we 
have seen, the strange objects that the proxy actualists posit in order to justify the 
validity of BS and NE give us cause to reject those theories. The theory advanced in this 
section, like proxy actualism, denies EI but refuses to posit any additional metaphysical 
objects to play the modal roles of mere possibilia and subsisting objects.  
Combinatorialism is centered on the idea that actually existing objects are 
sufficiently modally malleable to serve as truthmakers for our modal claims. Before I 
turn to a more thorough account of combinatorialism, I want to provide the reader with 
the combinatorialist’s intuitive picture of modality.  Consider William Lycan’s short 
explanation of the general intuition behind combinatorialism: 
Suppose that there are some metaphysically basic elements out of 
which our universe is composed. Call them “atoms” (in the 
metaphysical rather than the chemical sense). Our world, we may say, 
consists of these atoms’ being arranged in a certain fabulously 
complex way. […] Now let us construe “other possible worlds” as 
alternative arrangements of our atoms which mirror the ways our 
world might have been just as the actual arrangement mirrors the 
world as it is. (304-5) 
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I mention this intuitive picture only to give the reader a general sense of the 
theories that will be discussed in this section: the theories I discuss are much more 
complex and much more suitable to our purposes than the simple intuitive picture just 
discussed. However, all combinatorialist theories share the intuition that the atoms of the 
actual world could have entered into different complex relationships with one another to 
form radically different possible worlds. In the next two subsections, I will be 
explicating and evaluating two distinct theories of combinatorialism that are united by 
this intuitive picture. I start with David M. Armstrong’s theory, which he advances in 
great detail in A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. 
5.1 A COMBINATORIAL THEORY OF POSSIBILITY 
Before I can give a full account of Armstrong’s combinatorial theory, I will need 
to make some preliminary remarks about his ontology, as it is fundamentally different 
from the ontologies previously discussed. With the exception of Plantinga’s proxy 
actualism, the previous ontologies we have discussed have included at least two 
categories of being. For example, the Meinongian carves being into the categories of 
subsisting and existing objects just as Linsky and Zalta carve being into the contingently 
concrete and contingently nonconcrete. We have seen that, in some cases, the division of 
being into two categories can make a modal theory appear to be Meinongian. So, one 
natural response is to refuse to divide being into two categories, to argue that there is but 
one category of being. David Armstrong’s theory contains a so-called “one-category” 
ontology. 
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 According to Armstrong, all that fundamentally exists are actually existing states 
of affairs (Armstrong 43). In order to clarify what a state-of-affairs is, it is necessary to 
briefly return to our ordinary way of thinking of atoms and universals, with the promise 
that atoms and universals are not the fundamental constituents of Armstrong’s ontology. 
We might divide our ontology into two categories of things: atoms and universals, 
where atoms are individuals that “have no individuals as proper parts” and where 
universals are “properties that “can be possessed by more than one … individual” (38-
39).  Now, imagine that we predicate ‘F’ of the atom a. We might think that what makes 
the statement ‘Fa’ true is the existence of both the universal F and the atom a. However, 
as Armstrong notes, “The existence of a and the property F by no means ensures that a 
is F. If we are ontologically serious, we shall require a truth-maker to correspond to this 
truth: the state of affairs of a’s being F” (Armstrong 41).20 That is, the mere existence of 
a and F does not guarantee that a is related to F in any particular way and thus the mere 
existence of these two individuals does not guarantee the truth of ‘Fa’. Armstrong holds 
that what makes ‘Fa’ true is that the state of affairs of a’s being F exists. 
Now, the way I’ve just explicated Armstrong’s argument for the existence of 
states of affairs seems to rely on the existence of atoms and universals and thus it seems 
that I’ve broken my promise to rid Armstrong’s ontology of everything but states of 
affairs. That is, it seems that Armstrong is committed to the view that a (fundamentally) 
exists and F (fundamentally) exists and, when the two are united under some relation, 
                                                                                                    
20 Italics on F are mine. 
  
42 
a’s being F (fundamentally) exists in addition to a and F. This is not Armstrong’s view 
(43). Armstrong writes,  
We make think of an individual, such as a, as no more than an 
abstraction from all those states of affairs in which a figures, [and] F 
as an abstraction from all those states of affairs in which F figures 
[…]. By ‘abstraction’ is not meant that a [and] F… are in any way 
other-worldly, still less ‘mental’ or unreal. What is meant that, 
whereas by an act of selective attention they may be considered apart 
from the states of affairs in which they figure, they have no existence 
outside states of affairs. 
So, according to Armstrong, the world consists entirely of states of affairs, which 
have atoms and universals as constituents. However, these constituents do not 
fundamentally exist like states of affairs do, they are the products of our selective 
attending to states of affairs: the distinction between atoms, universals, and states of 
affairs is a mere distinction of reason, rather than a distinction of fact.21  
Armstrong recognizes that this argument might not be convincing to some, but 
this is not the place to give a full-throated defense of a state-of-affairs-based ontology 
(43-44). So, for the remainder of this section I will be assuming that Armstrong’s single-
                                                                                                    
21 Note, however, that this ‘distinction of reason’ is the only means by which we individuate, or 
give identity conditions for states of affairs. For example, the state of affairs a’s being G is 
distinct from a’s being F because the former has G as a constituent and the latter has F as a 
constituent. The same works mutatis mutandis for cases where the atoms differ. 
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category ontology is a legitimate ontology that can provide us with a systematic 
metaphysical picture. On to Armstrong’s theory of modality. 
In order to explain Armstrong’s combinatorialism, I will need to make some 
further distinctions. The first is between an atomic state of affairs and a molecular state 
of affairs. An atomic state of affairs is a state of affairs understood through a “distinction 
of reason” as being consisting of one atom and one universal: a’s being F is an example 
(41). A molecular state of affairs is a conjunction of atomic states of affairs, where that 
conjunction contains no “negative or disjunctive states of affairs”(45). So, per our 
previous example, a’s being F and b’s being G is a molecular state of affairs, while 
neither a’s being F and a’s being not-G nor a’s being either F or G are molecular states 
of affairs. 
Armstrong identifies possible worlds with molecular states of affairs, where the 
actual world is a possible world identical to the molecular state of affairs that results 
from conjoining all the existing atomic states of affairs (45). Nonactual, possible worlds 
are constructed by selectively attending to the constituents of the actually existing states 
of affairs and ‘recombining’ them into nonexistent, merely possible states of affairs. I’ll 
explain. 
Imagine a world w1 containing only four objects: two atoms, a and b, and two 
universals, F and G.22 In this world, let a exemplify F and b exemplify G. Let ‘a’, ‘b’, 
                                                                                                    
22 This example is borrowed from Armstrong (58), but is adjusted for simplicity. Imagine scare 
quotes throughout, as Armstrong is not committed to the existence of anything apart from states 
of affairs. Recombination, however, is best explained by entertaining the existence of universals 
and atoms. 
  
44 
‘F’, and ‘G’ denote a, b, F, and G, respectively. As a matter of fact, the statements ‘Fa’ 
and ‘Ga’ are true at w1 because a exemplifies F and b exemplifies G. However, because 
they are atoms, a could have exemplified G and b could have exemplified F. We might 
call the world, w2 , containing a, b, F, and G where a exemplifies F and b exemplifies G 
a possible world that is a recombination of the elements of w1. The main intuition behind 
combinatorialism is that our world, unlike w1 is a massively complex combination of 
atoms and universals that, like w1 could have been “recombined” to form other 
massively complex possible worlds, like w2. The same procedure holds for the 
construction of massively complex possible worlds. 
Strictly speaking, Armstrong believes that the only states of affairs that (in any 
sense) exist are actually existing states of affairs: the molecular state of affairs identical 
to the actual world is a conjunction of all and only existing atomic states of affairs. This 
fact makes Armstrong’s notion of a possible state of affairs a bit difficult to explain, so I 
will leave it up to Armstrong. He writes: 
The notion of a possible state of affairs is introduced semantically, by 
means of the notion of an atomic statement. Let a be a simple 
individual, and F and G two simple properties. Let a be F but not G. 
Now consider the statements ‘a is F’ and ‘a is G.’ The former is true, 
and may be called an atomic statement. But the latter may also be 
called an atomic statement. While failing to correspond to an atomic 
state of affairs, it corresponds to the form of an atomic state of affairs: 
‘a’ picks out an actual atomic individual, ‘G’ falsely predicates a 
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genuine simple property of this individual….‘a is G’ is a false atomic 
statement. What it states, that a is G is false. But we can also say that 
a’s being G is a possible (merely possible) atomic state of affairs (45-
6). 
This passage from Armstrong seems to suggest that he countenances the 
existence of merely possible states of affairs, which suggests that Armstrong’s theory is 
not actualist after all! However, Armstrong does not posit merely possible states of 
affairs, so how can he make sense of the possibility of a’s being G? By denying that the 
statement ‘a is G,’ along with every false predication of a universal to an atom, refers to 
an existing state of affairs. Armstrong writes, 
It would not even be right to say that we can refer to [a merely 
possible state of affairs], at any rate if reference is taken to be a 
relation. Perhaps it is best to speak of ostensible reference. The 
parallel is with the ostensible (but very useful) reference that we make 
to ideal gasses, frictionless planes and so forth, in scientific 
investigations (46). 
So, Armstrong believes that nonexistent, merely possible atomic and molecular 
states of affairs can be treated as fictional objects that are ostensibly referred to, but 
which fail to exist.23 Again, we might provide arguments that conclude that Armstrong is 
                                                                                                    
23 Armstrong seems to realize the awkwardness of the so-called ‘Fictionalist’ element described 
here. He acknowledges that previous writers have argued that merely possible states of affairs 
might be substituted for by sets or mereological sums of atoms and universals that fail to 
constitute existing states of affairs. However, Armstrong rightly acknowledges that this move 
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in fact committed to the existence of merely possible states of affairs as well as the 
existence of universals and atoms in addition to the actually existing states of affairs. 
However, my project includes neither a defense of nor an attack on Armstrong’s 
position.24 Indeed, I will now argue that despite these worries about this theory, it is not a 
theory sufficient for providing a semantics for SQML. 
Armstrong’s modal metaphysics does not provide a suitable semantics for SQML 
because it cannot be reconciled with the validity of BS. Recall that BS requires that if a 
state of affairs possibly exists, then there must exist something that is possibly that state 
of affairs. There are two major issues with the validity of BS if we use Armstrong’s 
modal metaphysics as the semantics of SQML, both of which deserve discussion. 
First, Armstrong’s merely possible states of affairs must be constructed by 
recombinations of the constituents of actually existing states of affairs. However, there 
seem to be possible states of affairs that are not constructed from any of the constituents 
of the actual states of affairs. So, imagine the state of affairs a’s being a child of the 
Pope, where the Pope actually fails to have a child. Unfortunately for Armstrong, it is 
true ex hypothesi that no actually existing state has as one of its constituents the property 
of being a child of the Pope. Because it is impossible to recombine the constituents of 
                                                
seems ad hoc. In addition, such a move would commit one to the existence of atoms, universals, 
sets, and states of affairs, thus leaving one without a slim, one-category ontology (46). 
24 See Lewis for a critical review of Armstrong’s theory. 
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states of affairs that don’t in fact exist, Armstrong cannot admit the possibility that there 
could have existed a child of the Pope.25 
Second, even in cases where the antecedent of BS is true (i.e., the cases where 
the constituents up for recombination actually exist), Armstrong has no obvious way of 
justifying the truth of the consequent of BS. For a simple explanation, let’s return to our 
simple world, w1, which contains the states of affairs a’s being F and b’s being G. If we 
admit the possibility of the state of affairs a’s being G, then we must admit that there 
exist something in w1 that is possibly that state of affairs. However, there exists nothing 
in w1 that could have been the state of affairs a’s being G. Why not? Because states of 
affairs are individuated solely by their constituents: different constituents, different states 
of affairs.  The only candidates for that which is possibly a’s being G that exist in w1 are 
a’s being F and b’s being G. But if we replace either F with G in the former case or b 
with a in the latter, then the state of affairs under consideration fails to be identical with 
the state of affairs before the substitution and we cease to have the result we originally 
wanted: something that could have been a’s being G. 
To see why this result is absurd, consider the following case: let’s say that it’s 
possible that Barack Obama could have been born in Kenya. What we generally have in 
mind is a case where the ‘Barack Obama’ under counterfactual consideration is identical 
with the Barack Obama that happens to have been born in Hawaii. However, given the 
Armstrongian semantics for BS, we are able to make no such claim. Given his semantics, 
                                                                                                    
25 See Ch. 4 of Armstrong where he recognizes the tension his theory has with so-called ‘alien’ 
universals for a worry similar to this one. 
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we would have to say something like, “Barack Obama could have been Kenyan, if he 
had not been Barack Obama,” which is absurd. 
So, I conclude that Armstrong’s combinatorialism unmodified cannot serve as an 
adequate semantics for SQML because his ontology does not allow us to admit the 
possibilities required for the validity of BS. All is not lost for combinatorialist semantics 
for SQML: I will argue in the next subsection that there is an alternative form of 
combinatorialism that can provide a reasonable semantics for SQML, without the 
drawbacks of Armstrong’s theory.       
5.2 M-COMBINATORIALISM 
Up until now, I have been carefully considering the viability of previous theories 
of modality as providers for a reasonable semantics of SQML. Though I have given 
reasons to reject each theory, I do not believe that an actualist semantics of SQML is 
impossible to develop. In this subsection, I develop my own semantics for SQML that is 
heavily reliant on the intuitions discussed at the beginning of my section on 
combinatorialism. The theory I advance here will be a version of combinatorialism that 
dispenses with Armstrong’s states of affairs in favor of a three-category ontology. I call 
my theory Mereological combinatorialism, or M-Combinatorialism for short. 
Before I turn to a more careful explication of M-Combinatorialism, I want to 
develop the M-Combinatorialist's intuitive picture of modality, as I did with the 
combinatorialist’s general intuitive picture at the beginning of this section. According to 
M-Combinatorialists, the world is, at bottom, comprised of fundamental entities, which 
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I'll call simples.26 These simples are arranged into fabulously complex relations with 
each other, where the nature of the arrangement of simples determines which properties 
the mereological sum of those simples exemplifies.27 The intuition behind M-
Combinatorialism is this: had the universe had a slightly different history, the sums that 
actually exemplify certain properties could have exemplified different properties because 
their constitutive simples could have been arranged in many different ways. 
For example, return to the Pope's possible child. Presumably, any such child 
would have been a sum of myriad simples exemplifying the property of being a child of 
the Pope. On actualist versions of M-Combinatorialism, the sum that could have 
exemplified the property of being the Pope's child must actually exist. So, statements 
ostensibly about the Pope's possible child are statements in fact about actual sums of 
simples that could have jointly exemplified the property in question. More generally, 
when we make modal claims ostensibly about nonactual possible individuals, we are 
making claims about what properties actual sums could have exemplified and what 
relations simples and sums could have entered into. For the remainder of this subsection, 
I'll refine this actualist form of the M-Combinatorialist's theory of modality. 
The M-Combinatorialist has a three-category ontology: she posits simples, 
mereological sums, and universals. Each category deserves its own discussion, as the 
                                                                                                    
26Armstrong uses the term ‘atoms,’ where atoms are “first-order particulars that have no proper 
parts.” Because recent literature on mereology has adopted the term ‘simple’ to avoid confusing 
‘atoms’ with the atoms of chemistry, I will use ‘simple.’ 
27 The idea that simples enter into complex relations such that their sums exemplify different 
properties originates from van Inwagen. 
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answer to many purported objections to M-Combinatorialism, discussed in the next 
section, rely on the subtleties of the theory. I’ll start with the notion of a ‘simple’. 
  We can define simples in strictly mereological terms, with 'part' left as a 
primitive notion: 
 x is a proper part of y =df x is a part of y but y is not a part of x.  
 x is a mereological simple =df x has no proper parts (Markosian, 2). 
For the remainder of this essay, I won’t have much more to say about simples, 
but it is worth noting that I am committed to a very thin notion of simples: many partless 
objects might be simples and the kind of simples that exist is an a posteriori question 
that is outside the scope of this project. 
So, given this conception, the class of simples could be homogeneous. That is, I 
leave open the possibility that, at bottom, the world only consists of one kind of simples. 
However, Markosian’s conditions for a thing's being a simple leave open the possibility 
that there may be several different types of simples. Simples might be, for instance, the 
fundamental particles of quantum physics, if those particles turn out to be heterogeneous. 
This conception of 'simple-hood' is not a solely physical conception: I leave open the 
possibility that the world might ultimately be composed of nonphysical simples: this 
conception is open to the possibility that simples are objects like tropes, monads, 
universals, etc. Finally, my definition is consistent with McDaniel's view that there is 
“no correct, finitely statable, and non-circular” way to define simples, that 'simple-hood' 
is a brute concept (234). On to the next concept: mereological sums. 
The next concept to clarify is the concept of a mereological sum:  
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x overlaps y =df there is a z such that z is a part of x and z is a part of y. 
y is a mereological sum of the xs =df every one of the xs is a part of y 
and every part of y overlaps at least one of the xs (Markosian, 1). 
Now, there is a popular debate in mereology about what necessary and sufficient 
conditions must be in place for any given simples to compose a further a mereological 
sum.28 Mereological Nihilists hold that simples never compose mereological sums, 
Mereological Universalists hold that simples always compose mereological sums, and 
those who wish to restrict composition give conditions under which simples compose 
mereological sums. M-Combinatorialism includes sums in its fundamental ontology, so 
it is incompatible with Mereological Nihilism. That leaves the M-Combinatorialist with 
two options—either simples always compose mereological sums or simples compose 
mereological sums given restricted conditions. I will argue that the M-Combinatorialist 
cannot accept the latter view, because it would commit her to the existence of merely 
possible mereological sums. 
Assume that there is some set of restrictions on composition. Because the 
mereological moderate is not a universalist (i.e., she hopes to restrict composition), she 
will hold that those conditions are not met by some actually existing simples. Those 
simples actually fail to compose a mereological sum. However, we can imagine a world 
in which those conditions are met and those simples form a further object. That is, there 
exists a sum of simples in that possible world that fails to exist in the actual world. That 
sum, then, is a merely possible sum. However, Actualism denies that there exist 
                                                                                                    
28 Cf. van Inwagen (1995), Sider (MS), Markosian (1998). 
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nonactual, possible entities of any kind. So, there can be no restrictions on composition. 
Mereological Universalism is entailed by any actualist form of combinatorialism.29 On to 
the third category of the M-Combinatorialist’s ontology: universals. 
I will use Armstrong’s conception of universals (39). Consider the following 
definition of universals, extracted from Armstrong’s work: 
F is a universal =df F is a property that is possibly exemplified by 
multiple particulars.   
Think of universals as those existents that give sums and simples their shareable 
characteristics. Universals are related to sums and simples through a primitive 
exemplification relation, such that if a sum or simple exemplifies a universal, then that 
sum or simple is charachtered by that universal. So, if a sum exemplifies, say, redness, 
then we can truthfully say of that sum that it is red, as the sum takes on a red character 
from the universal. Universals are possibly exemplified by multiple individuals: the M-
Combinatorialist’s ontology dispenses with Plantinga’s strange individual essences in 
favor of properties that are multiply-exemplifiable, a notion that was supported in a 
previous section. 
The M-Combinatorialist also posits the existence of unexemplified properties, 
but not unexemplifiable properties. Remember that a limiting feature of Armstrong’s 
theory was his restriction of universals to those that happen to be constituents of actual 
states of affairs. In an effort to avoid the problems that come with such a limit on 
                                                                                                    
29 That might be a tough entailment for some to swallow, so see van Cleve and Sider’s Four-
dimensionalism (120-32) for defenses of Mereological Universalism. 
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universals, I countenance the existence of unexemplified universals. For example, the 
universal being a child of the Pope is an unexemplified universal that could have been 
exemplified. The advantage of positing such universals is that they provide the M-
Combinatorialist with a greater stock of objects that are up for recombination. However, 
there is no need to countenance the existence of unexemplifiable universals like round-
squareness. Such universals are by their very nature unable to character any sums or 
simples, so are an unnecessary addition to the M-Combinatorialist’s ontology. 
It is also important to note that, given certain conditions, a sum might exemplify 
different properties. According to M-Combinatorialism, a sum exemplifies properties 
based on how its constitutive simples are arranged—where they are located with respect 
to one another in space-time, which sorts of (physical) bonds they enter into with one 
another, etc. (van Inwagen, 127). I do not take the notion of an ‘arrangement’ to be 
primitive: ‘arrangement’ is a term used to broadly denote the sorts of complex 
relationships that simples can enter into with one another. I take the nature of the 
different arrangements of simples to be an a posteriori matter relegated to the sciences, 
or, if simples are nonphysical substances, an a priori matter relegated to future 
metaphysicians. 
According to the M-Combinatorialist, all that exists are the simples, sums, and 
universals that exist in the actual world: there exist no subsisting simples, no merely 
possible sums, etc.. In fact, it is a key feature of M-Combinatorialism that the materials 
of the actual world are modally malleable enough to act as modal truthmakers for a wide 
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variety of cases. It is with these materials that the M-Combinatorialist is able to make 
sense of the validity of BS and to provide a semantics for SQML. 
Consider our earlier instance of BS, ∃x♢Fx→∃x♢Fx, where 'F' stands for ‘is a 
child of the Pope.’ The worry is that there doesn't seem to be an actual object that could 
have been a child of the Pope. The M-Combinatorialist responds that there is such an 
object: there is a mereological sum of the simples that could have been arranged to form 
a child of the Pope--a mereological sum that could have exemplified all of the properties 
necessary to deem it a child of the Pope. After all, we know that the child would have 
originated from some sperm and some egg, both of which presumably actually exist at 
some time, both of which are sums of actual simples, though (as a matter of fact) the 
sperm in question never fertilized the egg in question. Furthermore, it's not as if the 
simples that would have composed the Pope's child never existed because those gametes 
never came into contact: if the child had existed, she would have been composed of 
simples just like her mother and father. Those simples and that sum exist whether or not 
they exemplify the property of being a child of the Pope. The M-Combinatorialist, who 
must hold mereological universalism, simply acknowledges the existence of the sum of 
the simples that composed that sperm and egg along with the sum of the simples that 
would have formed the body of the Pope's child, at each stage of that child's life. So, 
there actually is something, namely a mereological sum, that could have been a child of 
the Pope. 
 The M-Combinatorialist has a general procedure for interpreting claims about 
nonactual, possible individuals. According to M-Combinatorialism, for any nonactual, 
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possible object, that object must have been composed of simples. Given actualism, that 
object must be constructed out of actually existing simples. Because M-
Combinatorialism entails mereological universalism, there does exist a sum of those 
simples, even if that sum fail to exemplify any of the properties of the nonactual, 
possible object under consideration. Because the simples that compose these sums could 
have been arranged otherwise, actually existing sums could have exemplified a massive 
range of different properties. These actual sums supplant any supposedly merely 
possible or subsisting object. 
The primary advantage of M-Combinatorialism over the theories previously 
discussed is that it helps us make sense of modality without extraordinary metaphysical 
commitments. Insofar as we require mereological sums, simples, and universals for other 
purposes, the M-Combinatorialist argues, we can use them for our modal truthmakers. 
Every other theory (with the exception of Armstrong’s) discussed so far has required us 
to posit a new range of entities and to include in our ideologies new primitive concepts: 
insofar as M-Combinatorialism dispenses with these strange commitments, while 
(purportedly) retaining their expressiveness, we ought to prefer M-Combinatorialism. 
Of course, previous forms of combinatorialism have faced serious objections, 
which can be used to challenge the expressiveness of M-Combinatorialism. In an effort 
to make my defense of M-Combinatorialism as strong as possible, I will levy those 
objections against my own theory and show how the M-Combinatorialist can allay its 
opponents’ concerns. 
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5.3 NECESSARY EXISTENCE AND WORLD-RELATIVE MODALITY 
In the previous subsection, I argued that the M-Combinatorialist can make sense 
of the validity of BS, though I neglected to argue how she can make sense of the validity 
of NE. Unlike the defense of the validity of BS, which is fairly obvious given the 
combinatorialist’s ontology, the defense of the validity of NE requires much more 
philosophical legwork.30 
M-Combinatorialism holds that the actually existing sums, simples, and 
universals necessarily exist, a position consistent with the validity of NE. However, 
there seems to be a conflict with Aliens and Absentees, due to this feature of the theory. 
Remember that Aliens is the intuition that there could have been more individuals than 
there actually are and Absentees is the intuition that some existing individual could have 
failed to exist. On one notion of an ‘individual,’ M-Combinatorialism and SQML are not 
committed to the necessary existence of individuals. Let me explain. 
We might conceive of individuals as ordinary, complex objects. Examples of 
those individuals would be persons, planets, toasters, etc. Pick any ordinary object you 
like. According to combinatorialism, it is true that both the mereological sum of the 
simples that compose that complex object and the simples themselves exist in every 
possible world. However, it is not necessary that a mereological sum take the form of a 
complex object or a natural kind—given mereological universalism, the same sum that 
exemplifies the properties of a toaster in the actual world could exemplify radically 
different properties in another possible world. So, there is a straightforward sense in 
                                                                                                    
30 See Ch.4 of Armstrong for the same worry applied to Armstrong’s system. 
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which there could have been more, fewer, or different individuals than there actually are, 
given this conception of individuals. A world with more individuals, on this 
interpretation, is a world where more mereological sums exemplify the properties 
necessary to appear as toasters, planets, persons, etc. A world with fewer individuals, on 
this interpretation, is a world in which fewer mereological sums meet these requirements. 
And, a world with different individuals is simply a world where the mereological sums 
that appear as toasters and planets in this world exemplify radically different properties. 
I take it that most of our intuitions about there being more, fewer, or different individuals 
than there actually are can be captured by combinatorialism in this manner.  
Of course, some objectors will not be satisfied with this response: they worry 
about the necessary existence of simples, sums, and universals. After all, these are the 
individuals that are part of the M-Combinatorialist’s fundamental ontology and it is 
these individuals that necessarily exist. This worry is well expressed by Lycan: 
It would seem to be possible that the world should have contained 
either more or less fundamental stuff. It is easy to envision an 
arrangement involving fewer atoms, or even one which would serve as 
the null world (presumably the null set). But how might we construct 
an arrangement corresponding to an increase in the amount of 
fundamental matter? … It seems, then, that any choice of a stock of 
atoms commits the combinatorialist to the necessary nonexistence of 
any more atoms, since there will be no arrangement and hence no 
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possible world in which there exists an atom that is not one of our 
prechosen[sic] stock….(305-6) 
Lycan’s worry is that M-Combinatorialism cannot give credence to the intuitions 
behind Aliens and Absentees. However, his argument goes, it is perfectly conceivable 
that (1) the world could have contained more or fewer simples and sums and (2) those 
simples and sums that actually exist could have failed to exist.31 I believe that the M-
Combinatorialist can make two responses to those who share Lycan’s intuitions. The 
first response I will consider is the weaker response. 
The M-Combinatorialist might respond by dividing up the notion of possibility 
and conceding that SQML and M-Combinatorialism are not compatible with one of 
those types of possibility. Consider two kinds of possibility, world-relative possibility 
and world-neutral possibility: ! is world-relatively possible if ! is possible relative to a fixed 
domain of individuals and a specific set of non-logical restrictions on 
possibility 
                                                                                                    
31 Of course, Lycan’s objection could be applied to universals as well. Unlike Armstrong, I allow 
for the existence of unexemplified universals, so it’s not clear that Lycan’s objection would still 
hold: after all, universals are often considered to be candidates for necessarily existing entities, 
whether or not they are exemplified. I suspect that Lycan would have difficulty convincing us 
that there could have been, say, more universals than there actually are. Cf. Armstrong, Chapter 
4. 
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! is world-neutrally possible if ! is possible, though not relative to a 
fixed domain of individuals nor a specific set of non-logical 
restrictions on possibility32 
Statements of world-relative possibility are statements about how the inhabitants 
of a particular world could have been. World-relative possibility is restricted by modal 
axioms; axioms that restrict which exemplifications of properties, states-of-affairs, etc. 
are possible, relative to a world.33 For any given restriction on possibility relative to a 
world, there will be a world-relative, non-logical axiom that will preclude that possibility. 
In physical worlds, for example, those non-logical axioms could be conceived as the 
laws of nature. Statements of world-neutral possibility are (1) not restricted by the modal 
axioms of any given world and (2) not restricted by the inhabitants of any specific 
possible world. World-neutral possibility comprises both logical and metaphysical 
possibility. World-neutral possibility is always restricted by logical axioms and can be 
                                                                                                    
32 I take this to be a novel distinction. Some might argue that I have supplanted nomological 
possibility with world-relative possibility and broadly logical or metaphysical possibility with 
world-neutral possibility. However, I argue (1) that world-relative possibility respects the 
intuitions of those who believe that simples are nonphysical, noncausal entities, (2) world-
relative possibility respects the intuitions of those who deny that there are laws of nature or laws 
of causality, (3) that world-neutral possibility is a helpful way to understand possibility 
independent of one’s beliefs about the legitimacy of metaphysical possibility, and, finally (4) 
that world-neutral possibility captures the intuition that when entertaining such possibility, we 
abstract away from the inhabitants of the actual world–we are not entertaining which laws of 
metaphysics hold, etc. 
33 This is a key point: Armstrong suggests that all recombinations of universals and atoms are 
permissible, though this is not obviously the case for the M-Combinatorialist (77-86). Imagine a 
sum consisting of simples that weighs 1 kg. Is it possible that such a sum weigh 1 mg? This is an 
area worth exploring for the M-Combinatorialist. 
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restricted by metaphysical axioms, if one wants to entertain so-called “metaphysical 
possibility.” 
One could argue that SQML is the logic of world-relative possibility and that M-
Combinatorialism provides the best semantics for SQML. It should not surprise us, they 
will argue, that schemas like BS and NE are true in all models of SQML. If we are 
speaking strictly in terms of world-relative possibility, then BS should not seem strange: 
take any given world, with its inhabitants and its axiomatic restrictions on possibility and, 
supposing that the existence of some complex object is possible, ask “is there some 
actual sum that could have been that object?” If said complex object’s existence is not 
ruled out by one of the axiomatic restrictions and does not require more, fewer, or 
different simples/sums than are in the world of consideration, then that object could have 
existed. NE ought to make more sense as well. Since we are only considering possibility 
relative to a world, claims about inhabitants outside of that world are false. So, there is a 
sense in which the inhabitants of the world in question exist necessarily, relative to the 
world in which they exist. 
Unfortunately, if they took this line, the M-Combinatorialist would be forced to 
submit that SQML is not the logic of world-neutral possibility, as world-neutral 
possibility is simply too malleable for SQML to handle. Let’s say, for example, that it is 
world-neutrally possible that the actual world could have had no simples, more simples, 
radically different simples, etc. While such a world is world-relatively impossible 
relative to the actual world, we have no world-neutral reason to doubt its possibility. We 
cannot expect SQML with an M-Combinatorialist semantics to handle such a world-
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neutral claim–it is simply outside the scope of our formal system and semantics. Those 
who consider world-neutral possibility to be a legitimate form of possibility will 
consider its incompatibility to be a defect of SQML. 
However, it strikes me that a stronger response for the combinatorialist is simply 
to abandon Aliens and Absentees with respect to simples, sums, and universals. The 
combinatorialist can argue that possibility and necessity are fundamentally restricted by 
the actual world: all statements of possibility must be restricted to the possible 
configurations of the actual world. All other statements of possibility unrestricted by 
what actually exists are the product of metaphysical extravagance–world-relative 
possibility is the only legitimate form of possibility. SQML is the logic of world relative 
possibility, M-Combinatorialism provides the best semantics for SQML, and intuitions 
unrestricted by the contents of the actual world are worth abandoning. If the 
combinatorialist makes this stronger response, she can consistently maintain that SQML 
is an adequate modal logic amenable to her actualist commitments. 
5.4 COULD RUSSELL HAVE BEEN A POACHED EGG? 
It is a key feature of M-Combinatorialism that its ontology contains modally 
malleable individuals. In the previous section, I detailed the M-Combinatorialist’s 
conception of complex objects as mereological sums of simples, where the properties of 
those sums change given the arrangement of those simples. It is also key to the theory 
that it is a sum’s constitutive simples that give it its particularity: in other words, the M-
Combinatorialist individuates sums based solely on their constitutive simples. This view 
of individuation is clearly at odds with any view that requires individuation based on 
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essential properties, like Plantinga’s view. So, a possible objection might go, M-
Combinatorialism is at odds with the intuitive view that what is essential to an object’s 
identity is some subset of its properties and not its component material parts. I will 
illustrate this worry with an example from Armstrong. He writes, 
It may be held that [Combinatorialism] is too latitudinarian because it 
would permit anything to be of almost any nature. It would permit 
Bertrand Russell to be a poached egg, to adapt an example of Pavel 
Tichy’s. Yet is this really a possibility? 
Russell, of course, is not a simple individual. But we are at present assuming that 
he is made up of simple individuals. Could these individuals have had certain properties, 
certain relations to each other, and perhaps to other individuals having certain properties, 
such that the original individuals so propertied and related constitute a poached egg? 
(51) The M-Combinatorialist is committed an affirmative answer to this question. 
Some will find this possibility absurd: they claim that Russell is not merely a 
sum of simples arranged in a certain way, but is a sum with certain essential properties. 
The claim is that since the (giant) poached egg created by rearranging Russell’s simples 
fails to exemplify those essential properties, that poached egg is not identical to Russell. 
However, the M-Combinatorialist is committed to the view that the egg is identical to 
Russell insofar as it is constituted by the same simples that constitute Russell. So, it 
seems that M-Combinatorialism is in direct conflict with this apparently intuitive 
position. How can the M-Combinatorialist respond? 
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Before I offer the M-Combinatorialist’s response, it will be helpful to clarify the 
essentialist intuitions. To do that I will employ Armstrong’s concepts of thin and thick 
particulars. A thin particular is, according to Armstrong,  “the particular in abstraction 
from all its properties and relations, the particular qua particular only”(52). For our 
purposes, a thin particular is either a mereological sum or a simple considered apart from 
the properties it exemplifies. Considered as a thin particular, Bertrand Russell is a sum 
of simples and nothing more. A thick particular is a mereological sum of simples 
considered along with all of the properties that it exemplifies. Considered as a thick 
particular, Bertrand Russell is a mereological sum that is also Caucasian, male, a 
philosopher, etc. 
Ordinarily, when the essentialist conceives of Russell as an individual, she 
conceives of what Armstrong calls a “particular of intermediate thickness”—we think of 
some of his properties as being essential to his identity and some of his properties as 
being nonessential to his identity (53). (After all, if we conceived of Russell only in his 
full thickness, we would have difficulty imagining how he could retain his identity 
through change in his properties.) So, when we imagine what Russell could have been, 
we imagine an individual with Russell’s constitutive simples and some essential 
properties (like his humanity, etc.). Considered as an intermediately thick particular, 
Russell could not have been a poached egg.  But, considered as a thin particular, Russell 
could have been a poached egg. However, the M-Combinatorialist does not countenance 
the existence of anything other than thin particulars. Let’s see why. 
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The quantifiers of SQML cannot be interpreted as ranging over anything other 
than thin particulars. If the quantifiers of SQML are interpreted as ranging over thick 
particular, the M-Combinatorialist will have difficulty justifying the validity of BS. For 
example, considered as an intermediately thick particular, the Pope’s child might be said 
to have the essential property of being a child of the Pope. If the quantifiers of SQML 
are interpreted as ranging over intermediately thick particulars, then BS will require not 
only that there exist some mereological sum (and some simples) that could have been the 
Pope’s child, it will also require that there exist something that already exemplifies the 
property of being a child of the Pope (or some relevant essential property). By 
hypothesis, however, no such mereological sum exists, so BS is invalidated. The 
essentialist will understand this result to be a defect of M-Combinatorialism, as she 
conceives of individuals as (intermediately) thick particulars.  
The best response for the M-Combinatorialist to make to the essentialist is 
simply to deny these intuitions and the existence of thick particulars: the M-
Combinatorialist should deny (consistent with her theory) that thick particulars exist, 
strictly speaking. While talk of thick particulars may be of pragmatic use, it is not talk 
that adequately represents reality’s fundamental structure. Though this response requires 
us to drop some of our (vague) intuitions about essential properties, this is a sacrifice 
worth marking if that sacrifice results in a lean theory that has valuable applications to 
our understanding of modality (Armstrong, 53).  
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6. CONCLUSION 
The primary goal of this thesis is to provide an elegant, actualist semantics for 
the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic. I have argued that previous attempts to give 
SQML a coherent semantics have come at the cost of positing metaphysical entities and 
metaphysical structure, a cost I believe to be unnecessary given the power of the M-
Combinatorialist’s semantics. Obviously, there is still work to be done developing a full-
blown theory of M-Combinatorialism: a fully-developed theory will, at minimum, (1) 
settle disputes about the nature of the fundamental entities the M-Combinatorialist posits 
(2) give an explicit metaphysical account of the notion of an ‘arrangement’ (3) give an 
explicit account of the restrictions of world-relative modality, whether they be physical, 
metaphysical, logical, etc. so that the space of possible recombinations can be mapped 
and (4) provide M-Combinatorial accounts of our intuitions of possibility and necessity. 
However, it has not been the goal of this thesis to provide a full account of M-
Combinatorialism, but merely to show that it provides a fully actualist semantics for a 
simple modal extension of familiar classical predicate logic. Insofar as it has achieved 
that goal, I consider it a success. 
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